




WHILE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS should be congratulated for recogniz-
ing and attempting to address what has become a national affordable
housing supply crisis, they may only do so by constitutional means.
Increasingly, local governments address the issue of affordable hous-
ing by means of mandatory set-asides of a percentage of affordable or
workforce housing, applied to private development.
Most attempts at mandatory set-asides suffer from several defects.
First, they often "exact" the workforce or affordable housing incre-
ments at an inappropriate and unconstitutional stage in the land devel-
opment process: rezoning. The premise upon which any and all legal
land development conditions-exactions, dedications, impact fees, in
lieu fees-rests is that they are development driven; the contemplated
project will require public facilities for which the landowner or devel-
oper must contribute a fair share.
[I]t is generally agreed that the law applicable to impact fees, exactions, and in lieu
fees, as well as to compulsory dedications, is similar, given that they all represent
land development conditions levied at some point in the land development process,
such as subdivision plat approval, shoreline management permit application, build-
ing permit application, occupancy permit application, or utility connection.'
Rezoning, while it may be a necessary precedent to land use and de-
velopment, neither creates nor drives the need for public facilities, in-
cluding affordable housing. It is therefore unconstitutional to require
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exactions of any kind as a condition for change of use by means of
zoning map amendments (rezoning):
Finally, we note again that such land development conditions-whether dedications,
exactions, or impact fees-are development driven. Without a demonstrable and
relatively immediate need for such facilities it is unconstitutional to "charge" them.
Therefore, levying such land development conditions on rezoning alone is almost
certainly unconstitutional. The fees and other conditions should be levied or charged
at some development permit or subdivision approval step, rather than as conditions
for land reclassification.2
Second, unless the local government can demonstrate a clear ratio-
nal and proportional nexus between market price development and the
imposition of below-market cost housing set-asides, it may not require
these set-asides at any stage in the land development process. What
scant precedent exists for imposing such exactions on residential devel-
opments does so only when the local government requiring such exac-
tions provides a series of meaningful bonuses to help offset the cost of
the mandatory affordable housing set-asides. As to the imposition of
such costs on non-residential development, the local government must
demonstrate that the development generates a need for such housing,
generally of the workforce variety, and that the amount to be set aside
is proportionate to that need. As one commentator recently noted in the
commercial housing set-aside context:
A number of cities have adopted exaction programs that require downtown office and
commercial developers to provide housing for lower-income groups or to a municipal
fund for the construction of such housing. [Such] programs satisfy the nexus test only
if the municipality can show that downtown development contributes to the housing
problem the linkage exaction is intended to remedy.3
I. Mandatory Affordable Housing (Linkage): Herein
of Authority, Constitutionality and Retroactivity
(Vested Rights)
By way of background, "(t]he broad concept of linkage describes any
of a wide range of municipal regulations that condition the grant of
development approval on the payment of funds to help finance services
and facilities needed as a result of development."4 "In the context of de-
veloping affordable housing, linkage refers to any scheme that requires
developers to mitigate the adverse effects of non-residential develop-
2. DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 254 (4th ed. 2004).
3. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra nOte 1, at § 9.23 (emphasis added).
4. Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 284 (N.J. 1990).
308 THE URBAN LAWYER 42-4/43-1 FALL 2010/WINTER 2011
MANDATORY SET-ASIDES 309
ment upon the shortage of housing either indirectly, by contributing
to an affordable-housing trust fund, or directly, by actually construct-
ing affordable housing."' Mandatory affordable housing requirements
or linkage fees in lieu of housing raise two basic takings issues. The
first issue is whether such fees pass scrutiny under the Supreme Court's
"essential nexus" test set out in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.6 The second issue is how the "rough proportionality" test of Dolan
v. City of Tigard7 applies.
As noted in a standard treatise on land use, "[t]here is some author-
ity for the use of set-asides and other housing exactions and fees to
provided needed low income housing, but whether this is a sufficient
basis for nexus, let alone proportionality, to stave off a constitutional
challenge, is not clear."8 Indeed, as another treatise observes, "[W]hen
the provision of lower-income housing is not linked to housing subsi-
dies, zoning incentives may be necessary to absorb losses incurred by the
developer on the lower-income units. Density bonuses are a possibility,
and the ordinance can also relax sited development requirements."9
A. Authority
Before addressing the constitutional issues, there is the initial question
of authority for housing set-asides or exactions. Thus, for example, Ha-
waii's impact fee statute' 0 does not apply to housing linkage fees, and,
indeed, expressly excludes such fees from the authority granted to Ha-
waii's four counties to levy impact fees for public facilities: "impact
fees may be imposed only for those types of public facility capital im-
provements specifically identified in a county comprehensive plan or a
facility needs assessment study."' However, the statute defines "impact
fees" as
5. Id.; accord MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note I at § 9.23 ("A number of
cities have adopted exaction programs that require downtown office and commercial
developers to provide housing for lower-income groups or contribute to a municipal
fund for the construction of such housing." (footnote omitted)); Jane E. Schukoske,
Housing Linkage: Regulating Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IowA L. REV.
1011, 1012 (1991) ("Housing linkage programs require or offer inducements to private
developers to produce affordable housing or to pay a sum for development of affordable
housing into housing trust funds."); John A. Henning Jr., Comment, Mitigating Price
Effects with a Housing Linkage Fee, 78 CAL. L. REV. 721, 722 (1990) (linkage fees are
a form of exactions that levy "fees on downtown office development to subsidize low-
and middle- income housing" (footnote omitted)).
6. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
7. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
8. ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, ch. 9, § 9.06 (2007).
9. LAND USE LAw, vol. 1, ch. 7, § 7.27 (2006) (emphasis added).
10. HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 46-141 to -148 (2006).
11. Id. § 46-142(b).
the charges imposed upon a developer by a county or board to fund all or a portion
of the public facility capital improvement costs required by the development from
which it is collected, or to recoup the cost of existing public facility capital improve-
ments made in anticipation of the needs of a development.12
That same section also defines "public facility capital improvement
costs" and explains that such costs "do not include expenditures for re-
quired affordable housing." 3 Moreover, the statute imposes nexus and
proportionality requirements, providing that "[a]n impact fee shall be
substantially related to the needs arising from the development and shall
not exceed a proportionate share of the costs incurred or to be incurred
in accommodating the development."' 4 It is therefore not at all clear that
Hawaii's counties have the power or authority to require workforce (af-
fordable) housing as a condition of land development approval.
While Hawaii courts have not ruled on this issue, a Virginia court has
done so. In Kansas-Lincoln, L.C. v. Arlington County Board'" the court
found that the county lacked both the authority to require a developer
to provide affordable housing as part of the land development process
at the zoning stage, and the authority to require an affordable housing
contribution as part of the site plan approval process.' 6 The court found
that the requirement was outside the legislative authority granted to Ar-
lington County by the Virginia General Assembly and was, therefore,
illegal and invalid.
To the same effect is an earlier decision-again from Virginia-
Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises." There, Fairfax County
amended its zoning ordinance to require "the developer of fifty or more
dwelling units in [several] zoning districts ... to commit himself, before
rezoning or site plan approval to build at least 15% of these dwelling
units as low and moderate income housing. . . ."' The trial court found
that the amendment was invalid on the grounds that the Board of Su-
pervisors exceeded its authority under the state's zoning enabling act,
the amendment was an improper delegation of legislative authority, and
the amendment was arbitrary and capricious. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Virginia agreed:
12. Id. § 46-141 (emphasis added).
13. Id. The legislative history of HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-141 does not explain what is
meant by "required affordable housing."
14. Id. § 46-143(c).
15. 66 Va. Cir. 274 (Cir. Ct. 2004).
16. Id. at 286.
17. 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973).
I18. Id. at 601.
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[T]he zoning enabling act does not authorize the governing body of a county to con-
trol compensation for the use of lands or the improvements thereon . . . The amend-
ment . . . exceeds the authority granted by the enabling act to the local governing
body because it is socio-economic zoning and attempts to control the compensation
for the use of land and the improvements thereon . . . Of greater importance, how-
ever, is that the amendment requires the developer or owner to rent or sell 15% of the
dwelling units in the development to persons of low or moderate income at rental or
sale prices not fixed by a free market ... .1
While both of these Virginia cases deny local governments the authority
to implement inclusionary zoning ordinances, the Virginia legislature
has enacted statutes that now allow local governments to require afford-
able housing set-asides or in-lieu fees.
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have taken a more direct route in
granting local governments the authority to enact inclusionary zon-
ing ordinances. In a challenge to an ordinance imposing mandatory
affordable housing fees on commercial developers as a condition on
development, a New Jersey appellate court stated that a "mandatory
development fee applied indiscriminately as a price to build within the
municipality has no real and substantial relationship to the regulations
of land."20 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding
that even though the state's zoning enabling act did not expressly grant
municipalities the power to impose affordable housing fees, municipali-
ty's police powers enable them to take action "as it may deem necessary
and proper for the good government, order and protection of persons
and property and for the preservation of the public health, safety and
welfare." 2' The court then stated that "[a] municipality in the exercise
of its police power clearly may seek to address housing problems." 22
In so holding, the court noted that the fee not only served the public
welfare but also had a real and substantial relationship to the regulation
of land. 23
Relying on Holmdel Builders Association, a Connecticut court upheld
an ordinance that "require[d] [property] owners who convert residential
units into non-residential uses, or who demolish residential housing,
to either replace the converted or demolished housing stock. . . or to
make a contribution to [a] low income housing fund... ."24 The court
19. Id. at 602.
20. Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 556 A.2d 1236, 1242 (1989), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 583 A.2d 277 (1990).
21. Holmdel Builders Ass'n, 583 A.2d at 286.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Gagne v. City of Hartford, No. CV 890358802S, 1994 WML 16841, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1994).
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noted that in Holmdel the enabling statute never expressly authorizes
imposition of development fees but implicitly the statute grants towns
the authority to require these fees in order to "provide for its fair share
of low and moderate income housing by means of any technique or
combination of techniques which provide a realistic opportunity for the
provision of its fair share."25 Although the state legislature never di-
rectly granted the City of Hartford the authority to enact the ordinance,
the city argued that the ordinance was authorized by the broad powers
given to municipalities under state law.26 The court agreed that section
7-148 granted the City of Hartford the implied power and authority to
require owners to replace residential property or to pay a fee to provide
for replacement housing.?
It is worth noting, however, that New Jersey-virtually alone among
the 50 states-has a well-developed common law that imposes fair
share affordable housing requirements on local governments (note: not
developers) as a matter of state constitutional law.28
B. A Constitutional Overview
While much of the recent case law dealing with such conditions and
exactions has developed from challenges to impact fees, the language is
applicable to all three. To be enforceable and valid, an impact fee must
be levied upon a development to pay for public facilities, the need for
which is generated, at least in part, by that development.29 This is the
25. Id. at *3 (quoting Holmdel Builders, 583 A.2d at 573).
26. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-148 (2010) which grants municipalities the power to:
1. Provide for the financing, construction, rehabilitation, repair improvement or
subsidization for lower- and moderate-income persons and families;
2. Make rules relating to the maintenance of safe and sanitary housing;
3. Regulate the mode of using and building when such regulations seem expedi-
ent for the purpose of promoting the safety, health, morals and general wel-
fare of the inhabitants of the municipality; and
4. Make and enforce police, sanitary or other similar regulations and protect or
promote peace, safety, good government and welfare of the municipality and
its inhabitants.
27. Gagne, 1994 WL 16841, at *3.
28. For an overview and development of New Jersey's common law, see the trio of
decisions known as the Mount Laurel cases, S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d 465 (N.J. 1972), modified by, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), rev'd, 456
A.2d 390 (1983).
29. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE, supra note 2, at ch. 4;
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE: PAYING THE COSTS OF
GROWTH THROUGH IMPACT FEES AND OTHER LAND REGULATION CHARGES (James
C. Nicholas ed., 1985) [hereinafter JUERGENSMEYER, FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE]; Brian
W. Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The Second Generation, 38 WASH.
U. J. URBi. & CONTEMP. L. 28 (1990); David L. Callies, Impact Fees, Exactions and Payingfor Growth in Hawaii, 11 U. HAw. L. REV. 295 (1989) [hereinafter Callies, Impact Fees].
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so-called "rational nexus" test developed by the courts in Florida and
other jurisdictions that have considered such fees and exactions. 0 First
proposed in 1964,1 it became the national standard by the end of the
1970s.32 The test essentially has two parts. First, the particular develop-
ment must generate a need to which the amount of the exaction bears
some rough proportionate relationship. Second, the local government
must demonstrate that the fees levied will actually be used for the pur-
pose collected.33
This test was made applicable to all land development conditions by
the United States Supreme Court in 1987. Decided on the last day of
the Court's 1987 term, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission34 deals
ostensibly with beach access. Property owners, James and Marilyn Nol-
lan, sought a coastal development permit from the California Coastal
Commission to tear down a beach house and build a bigger one. The
commission granted the permit only upon condition that the owners
give the general public the right to walk across the owners' backyard
beach area, an easement over one-third of the lot's total area. The pur-
pose, the commission said, was to preserve visual access to the water,
which was impaired by the much bigger beach house. The Court, how-
ever, held that, assuming the commission's purpose to overcome the
psychological barrier to the beach created by overdevelopment was a
valid public purpose, it could not accept that there was any nexus be-
tween that interest or purpose and the public lateral access or easement
condition attached to the permit.35
The Court stated, however, that it is an altogether different matter if
there is an "essential nexus" between the condition and what the land-
30. See, e.g., Hernando County v. Budget Inns of Fla., Inc., 555 So. 2d 1319 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Frisella v. Town of Farmington, 550 A.2d 102 (N.H. 1988); Bal-
tica Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd. of Franklin Twp., 537 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 387 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 1990); Unlimited v.
Kitsap County, 750 P.2d 651 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
31. Ira Michael Heyman & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); see also Fred P Bosselman & Nancy Stroud, Legal
Aspects of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS (Frank & Rhodes ed.
1987) [hereinafter Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Aspects].
32. See Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Aspects, supra note 31, at 74.
33. Fred P Bosselman & Nancy E. Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land
Development Linkage, 9 NOVA. L. REV. 381, 397-99 (1985) [hereinafter Bosselman &
Stroud, Mandatory Tithes]; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583
A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990).
34. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
35. Id. at 838-39. For full discussion see J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the
"Essential Nexus": How State and Federal Courts have Applied Nollan and Dolan and
Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373 (2002).
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owner proposes to do with the property. 36 Thus, local governments must
consider several important factors when levying impact fees:
1. The fees must generally be charged as part of the land develop-
ment process, not the land reclassification or rezoning process.
Fees are development-driven, and land reclassification, while it
may well be a prelude to development, does not create any need
for public facilities whatsoever.37
2. Collected fees do not belong in the general fund, or the need is
questionable.
3. The fees cannot be kept by government indefinitely, or the need is
questionable.
Ignoring the foregoing raises a presumption, as a matter of both law and
policy, that the impact fee is nothing more than a revenue-raising device,
either for a facility that has nothing to do with the land development upon
which the fee is raised, or for undetermined fiscal purposes generally. In
either case, the "fee" is then presumed to be a tax. This characterization
as a tax is almost always fatal to an impact fee since most local govern-
ments have very little specific authority to tax beyond the property tax
and, occasionally, a sales or income tax. Because an impact fee is none of
the above, and because all local government taxes must be supported by
specific statutory authority, the fee is almost always declared illegal.38
The Nollan Court did not discuss the required degree of connec-
tion between the exaction imposed and the projected impacts of the
proposed development. This issue was left open until 1994 when the
United States Supreme Court decided Dolan v. City of Tigard.39 In this
36. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37; see also CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAND USE, supra note 2; Bosselman & Stroud, Mandatory Tithes, supra note 33;
Brenda Valla, Linkage: The Next Stop in Developing Exactions, 2 GROWTH MGMT.
STUD. NEWSL. 4 (1987); Callies, Impact Fees, supra note 29; Jerold S. Kayden &
Robert Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analysis, 50 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1987); Rachelle Alterman, Evaluating Linkage and Beyond,
32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1988). But see Holmdel Builders Ass'n, 583
A.2d 277(upholding impact fees for housing as functional equivalents of mandatory
set-asides, which the court had already approved under New Jersey's constitutionally
based "fair share" doctrine).
37. Although in California such fees are charged when land is rezoned to planned
unit development (PUD), a special zone in most jurisdictions, often carrying with it
developmental rights.
38. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., Inc. v. Riddel, 510 P.2d 376 (Ariz.
1973); Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 R2d 376 (Utah 1982) . See generally JUERGENS-
MEYER, FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 29; Robert M. Blake & Julian C. Juer-
gensmeyer, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma,
247 LAND USE & ENvTL. L. REV. 14 (1987).
39. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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5-4 decision, the Court held for the first time that a city must demon-
strate a "reasonable relationship" between the conditions imposed on a
development permit and the development's impact.t
Florence Dolan owned a plumbing business and electrical supply
store located in the business district of Tigard, Oregon, along Fanno
Creek, which flowed through the southwestern corner of the lot and
along its western boundary. Dolan applied to the city for a building
permit to double the size of the store and pave the 39-space parking
lot. To mitigate for increased runoff from her property that would result
from her expansion plans, the commission required that Dolan dedi-
cate to the city the portion of her property lying within the 100-year
flood plain along Fanno Creek for a public greenway. To mitigate for
increased traffic and congestion caused by an increase in visitors to her
store, the commission also required that Dolan dedicate an additional
15-foot strip of land adjacent to the flood plain as a public pedestrian
and bicycle pathway.
While in Dolan there was a clear nexus between the impact of the
proposed development and the conditions required by the commis-
sion, the Supreme Court adds a second test beyond "nexus": whether
the degree or amount of the exactions demanded by the city's permit
conditions were sufficiently related to the projected impact of the devel-
opment proposed. The Court coined the term "rough proportionality"
to describe the required relationship between the exactions and the pro-
jected impact of the proposed development.4' While "[n]o precise math-
ematical calculation is required . . . the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." 42
The Court reviewed the exactions (the two required dedications, of
the public greenway and the pedestrian and bicycle pathway) and found
that the city's burden on the development was not roughly proportional
to the adverse effects the development would create. Therefore, the ex-
actions were unconstitutional.
Together, Nollan and Dolan require that to pass constitutional mus-
ter, land development conditions imposed by government must:
40. Id. at 390.
41. Id. at 391. After coining the term "rough proportionality,"' the Court, in its majority
opinion, never used that term again when it applied its decision to the facts; instead it
continued to use the words "required reasonable relationship" or "reasonably related."
Notably, the Court rejected stricter standards as the constitutional norm. See Herron v.
Mayor of Annapolis, 388 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570-71 (D. Md. 2005).
42. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
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1. Seek to promote a legitimate state interest;
2. Be related to the land development project upon which they are
being levied by means of a rational or essential nexus; and
3. Be proportional to the need or problem which the land develop-
ment project is expected to cause, and the project must accord-
ingly benefit from the condition imposed.
Under the first standard, legitimate state interest, an agency may only
require a landowner to dedicate land (or interests in land) or contribute
money for public projects and purposes, such as public facilities and, in
most jurisdictions, public housing.
Under the second standard, essential nexus, an agency must find a
close connection between the need or problem generated by the pro-
posed development and the land or other exaction or fee required from
the landowner or developer. Thus, for example, a residential devel-
opment will in all probability generate a need for public schools and
parks. A shopping center or hotel in all probability will not. Both will
generate additional traffic and therefore generate a need for more streets
and roads.
Under the third standard, proportionality, a residential development of,
say, three hundred units may well generate a need for additional class-
room space, but almost certainly, not a new school or school site. On
the other hand, such a residential development of several thousand units
would, when constructed, likely generate a need for a new school and
school site, depending upon the demographics of the new residents.
C. A Constitutional Issue: Nexus
Because linkage fees for affordable or workforce housing are a form
of exaction, they are subject to the "essential nexus" takings test of
Nollan.4 3 Under Nollan, "a permit condition that serves the same le-
gitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should
not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not
constitute a taking."" In addition, under Nollan, the government bears
the burden of proving this nexus. 45 Linkage fees satisfy this test "only if
43. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); see Commercial
Builders of N. Cal. v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991).
44. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 (emphasis added).
45. Dolan, 512 U.S. 391 n.8 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836).
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the municipality can show that development contributes to the housing
problem" the linkage exaction is intended to remedy."47
There is no disagreement that Nollan's nexus test, or its close equiva-
lent, applies to linkage fees. For example, in Commercial Builders of
Northern California v. Sacramento,48 the Ninth Circuit held that an or-
dinance which imposed a linkage "fee in connection with the issuance
of permits for nonresidential development of the type that will generate
jobs,"49 (in other words, a workforce affordable housing requirement)
was constitutional under Nollan. 0 Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance
directly on Nollan grounds: lack of nexus or connection between the
development and the affordable housing condition. First, the court ad-
dressed the holding of Nollan. Nollan holds that where there is no evi-
dence of a nexus between the development and the problem that the
exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot be upheld.5 ' The court
then explained that "the [o]rdinance was implemented only after a de-
tailed study revealed a substantial connection between development and
the problem to be addressed."52
The Court related at some length what the City of Sacramento did to
establish the "substantial connection between the development and the
problem" of affordable housing. First, it commissioned a study of the
need for low-income housing, the effect of non-residential development
on the demand for such housing, and the appropriateness of exacting
fees in conjunction with such developments to pay for housing:
[The study] estimat[ed] the percentage of new workers in the developments that
would qualify as low-income workers and would require housing. [The study] also
calculated fees for development . . . Also as instructed, however, in the interest of
46. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 1, at § 9.23. A "housing problem" is
the typical interest which the counties of Hawai'i identify as a legitimate state inter-
est in their ordinances. See, e.g., MAUI, HAW., CODE § 2.94.010 (2007) ("The council
finds that there is a critical shortage of affordable housing in the county."); HAWAIi,
HAW., CODE § 11-2(5) (2010) (setting forth the objective of "Requir[ing] large resort
and industrial enterprises to address related affordable housing needs as a condition of
rezoning approvals, based upon current economic and housing conditions"). In Ass'n
of Owners v. Honolulu, 742 P.2d 974 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987), the Intermediate Court of
Appeals of Hawai'i acknowledged the legitimacy of this interest in the context of the
challenge to a condominium declaration, stating that "affordable housing and public
parking for downtown Honolulu were important to the welfare of the community." Id.
at 985.
47. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 1, at § 9.23.
48. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 873 (emphasis added).




erring on the side of conservatism in exacting the fees, it reduced [the] final calcula-
tion[] by about one-half. Based upon this study, the City of Sacramento enacted the
Housing Trust Fund Ordinance [which] . .. included the fifiding that nonresidential
development is 'a major factor in attracting new employees to the region' and that the
influx of new employees 'creates a need for additional housing in the City.' Pursu-
ant to these findings, the Ordinance imposes a fee in connection with the issuance of
permits for nonresidential development of the type that will generate jobs.
Consequently, the court found "that the nexus between the fee provi-
sion here at issue, designed to further the city's legitimate interest in
housing, and the burdens caused by commercial development is suf-
ficient to pass constitutional muster."54
Even courts that decline to apply heightened scrutiny to legisla-
tively imposed fees nonetheless apply some form of Nollan's essen-
tial nexus test. For instance, in San Remo Hotel L.P v. City & County
of San Francisco,55 although the California Supreme Court reaffirmed
that legislatively imposed, ministerial impact fees are not subject to the
tests of Nollan/Dolan,5 6 the court nonetheless required that there "be a
'reasonable relationship' between the fee and the deleterious impacts
for the mitigation of which the fee is collected." 7 Similarly, in Holmdel
Builders Association v. Township of Holmdel,58 although the Supreme
Court of New Jersey concluded that legislative fees are not subject to
the heightened scrutiny of its "but-for" "rational-nexus" test, it still
required some relationship between the development and the harm
caused. 9 The court essentially explained that the "relationship between
the private activity that gives rise to the exaction and the public activity
to which it is applied," must be "founded on [an] actual, albeit indirect
and general, impact. . . ."6
The California Court of Appeals echoes the decision in San Remo
by denying the Nollan/Dolan strict scrutiny test to a legislatively en-
acted ordinance but still requiring a reasonable relationship between
the ordinance's means and ends.6' In Building Industrial Ass'n of Cen-
tral California v. City of Patterson, the city entered into a development
agreement that provided for an affordable housing in-lieu fee of $734
53. Commercial Builders of N. Cal., 941 F.2d at 873.
54. Id. at 875.
55. 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002).
56. Id. at 102-03.
57. Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
58. 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990).
59. Id. at 288.
60. Id.
61. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Cent. Cal. v. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63 (Ct.
App. 2009).
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per market rate unit to be paid by the developer to the city with a caveat
that allowed for a "reasonably justified" increase in the fee based on the
findings of an updated affordable housing fee analysis.62 In accordance
with the updated analysis, the city raised the affordable housing fee
from $734 to $20,946 per market rate unit.63 The court held that the de-
velopment agreement's increased affordable housing in-lieu fee was not
"reasonably justified" because the fee had no reasonable relationship to
the "deleterious public impact" the planned sub-division would have on
affordable housing."1 Although the court's ruling only held that the de-
velopment agreement's increased affordable housing in-lieu fee was not
reasonably justified and thus impermissible, the language of the court's
decision goes much further than this development agreement. 65
In developing the affordable housing in-lieu fee, the city examined
subsidies that would bridge the affordability gap between moderate,
low-, and very low-income households and the price of market rate
units. The city calculated the total subsidy that would be required to
bridge the affordability gap based on the requirement of 642 units of
affordable housing allocated to the city by the 2001 to 2002 Regional
Housing Needs Assessment for Stanislaus County. This total subsidy
of $73.5 million was spread over the 3,507 unentitled units left to be
constructed according to the city's general plan. Although this calcula-
tion has a direct relationship to the city's overall need for affordable
housing, it has no relationship to the effects of a new development on
the need for affordable housing.
While the court never comments on the constitutionality of the origi-
nal fee, 66 in concluding that the increased fee violated the development
agreement, the court clearly finds that even outside of the development
agreement context, the new in-lieu housing fee is impermissible; "the
fee calculations . . . do not support a finding that the fees to be borne by
Developer's project bore any reasonable relationship to any deleterious
impact associated with the project." 67
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 73.
65. "The level of constitutional scrutiny applied by the court in San Remo Hotel
must be applied to City's affordable housing in-lieu fee and is one of the legal require-
ments incorporated into the Development Agreement." Id.
66. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 67-68 (discussing where the affordable
housing fee would be used as leverage with the federal government to receive grants
and loans).
67. Id. at 74.
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Notably, the only part of the Nollan test that was not applied in San
Remo or Holmdel Builders Association, is the shifting of the burden of
proof to the government. While unclear in Nollan, the Court clarified
in Dolan that the burden of proof shifts to the government. There, the
Court cited to Nollan when it said that "the burden properly rests on
the city."68 What is important, however, is that all jurisdictions at least
require some form of nexus between the harm caused by the develop-
ment and the interest that the exaction purportedly serves. Thus, even
under the California or New Jersey approach, Nollan's requirement that
the "same" interest be served by the exaction69 still applies, albeit in
different terms.
D. A Constitutional Issue: Proportionality
Provided the regulation satisfies the nexus requirement, the second issue
is what reasonable percentage of affordable or workforce housing will
meet the constitutional proportionality test under Dolan or some similar
proportionality requirement. As one recent commentator noted: "[a]n
inclusionary zoning ordinance deserves . . . judicial deference ... pro-
vided that the program addresses a lack of affordable housing at a
level proportionate to each development and it can be defended through
sufficient planning by each municipality."0 Much is clearly dependent
upon the circumstances in each case, but as one treatise on land use has
observed, while "set-aside percentages and development size require-
ments vary across the country[,] [m]ost set-asides range from ten to
twenty percent."7'
Concern over a shrinking workforce and hopes of "enhanc[ing] the
public welfare by ensuring that the housing needs of the County are ad-
dressed," led the Maui County Council to pass Ordinance 3418, Maui
County's Residential Workforce Housing Policy. 72 By far the most bur-
densome housing policy in the country, Ordinance 3418 requires devel-
opers to set aside up to 50% of new units for affordable housing needs."
68. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994) (citing Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987)).
69. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
70. Brian Lerman, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning-The Answer to the Affordable
Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 383, 398-99 (2006) (emphasis added).
71. ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, ch. 3, § 3.07[3] (2007).
72. MAUI, HAW. CODE § 2.96.010 (2007).
73. "Most cities require ten or fifteen percent of the [newly constructed] housing be
affordable ... with the most aggressive city requiring thirty-five percent affordability.
See Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating
Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 971 (2002).
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Any development that seeks a final subdivision or building permit ap-
proval for five or more new dwelling units or lots may be held to the
requirements of the ordinance.74 Furthermore, any hotel development
or renovation that converts one or more hotel units into dwelling units
or increases the number of total units in the hotel falls under the scope
of the ordinance.75
Depending upon the expected sales price of the units in the devel-
opment, the developer will be required to set aside 40 or 50% of the
units to affordable housing.76 If 50% or more of the units will be sold
at a price below $600,000, a 40% set aside is required, while a 50%
set aside is required for developments expecting to sell at least 50%
of the units for more than $600,000.77 The ordinance does, however,
provide a developer with an appeals process to reduce, adjust, or waive
the requirements of the ordinance if there is no "reasonable relationship
or nexus between the impact of the development" and the required set
aside.78
To comply with these set aside requirements, developers may offer
for sale or rent single or multi-family dwelling units "as residential
workforce housing within the community plan area" or can convey
these units to a qualified housing provider who will then sell or rent
the units as residential workforce housing.79 In lieu of providing these
affordable housing units, the developer may choose to pay fees or dedi-
cate improved land equivalent to "thirty percent of the average pro-
jected sales price of the market rate dwelling units and/or new lots in the
development." 0 The developer may also dedicate unimproved land in
lieu of providing affordable housing units; however, the value of unim-
proved land must be twice that of an improved land dedication. 8 '
Since its December 2006 enactment, the ordinance has been chal-
lenged in federal district court 2 by a Maui developer who had planned
two multi-family residential projects, but determined that development
would be economically infeasible under the ordinance. Developer Ka-
maole Pointe appealed to the council for a waiver from the ordinance,
74. MAUI, HAW. CODE § 2.96.030 (2007).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 2.96.040.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 2.96.030.
79. MAUI, HAW. CODE § 2.96.040(B) (2007).
80. Id. § 2.96.040(B)(4)(a).
81. Id. § 2.96.040(B)(4)(b).
82. See Kamaole Pointe Dev. L.P. v. County of Maui, No. 07-00447 DAE-LEK,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96388 (D. Haw. Nov. 25, 2008).
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which was denied when the council found a "reasonable nexus between
the impact of the ... proposed developments and the need for afford-
able housing on Maui. 83 The federal district court dismissed Kamaole
Pointe's claims without ruling on the constitutionality of the ordinance,
finding the claims to be unripe." Even if the court tried the case on the
merits and found a nexus between the development and the need for af-
fordable housing, it would be hard pressed to find proportionality in an
ordinance that requires 40 or 50% set-asides while offering no palpable
incentives other than fast-track permitting.
A mandated review of the ordinance required every two years may
render the Kamaole Pointe case moot. The Maui County Council con-
ducted its first obligatory review of the housing policy in February
2009. While stopping short of demanding a repeal of the ordinance, de-
velopers and nonprofit builders called for its amendment pointing to the
"lack of homes built in the past two years [which] proves the ordinance
is flawed, and the economic downturn necessitates extra incentives to
build. 8 Developers suggested ideas for amending the ordinance such
as lowering the set aside requirement to 30 to 40%, allowing for a faster
permitting process, and providing more transferable housing credits to
nonprofit builders.86
The author of the ordinance maintains that the program is a success,
pointing to the approval of over a thousand units under the ordinance's
provisions." He conceded, however, that the ordinance was designed to
help working families, a goal that it has so far failed to meet. 8
E. A Review of Cases Upholding Inclusionary
Affordable Housing Programs
The handful of cases upholding inclusionary housing programs is eas-
ily distinguishable. Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City
of Sacramento is already discussed above where the Ninth Circuit held
83. Id. at *3-4.
84. Id. at *22.
85. Chris Hamilton, Council Reviews Housing Statute: Critics Say the Measure




88. "Council Members Danny Mateo and Joe Pontanilla rendered their verdicts on
the first two years of the Residential Workforce Housing ordinance Wednesday: It isn't
working for the gap group of working families." See Harry Eagar, County Housing Plan
Scrutinized, MAUI NEWs, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.mauinews.com/pagel
content.detail/id/51507J.html.
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that a City of Sacramento ordinance was constitutional under Nollan.
To reiterate:
We . . . agree with the City that Nollan does not stand for the proposition that an ex-
action ordinance will be upheld only where it can be shown that the development is
directly responsible for the social ill question. Rather, Nollan holds that where there
is no evidence of a nexus between the development and the problem that the exaction
seeks to address, the exaction cannot be upheld. Where, as here, the Ordinance was
implemented only after a detailed study revealed a substantial connection between
development and the problem to be addressed, the Ordinance does not suffer from the
infirmities that the Supreme Court disapproved in Nollan.9
Also, in Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of
Napa," the city enacted an inclusionary zoning ordinance requir-
ing 10% of all newly constructed units be affordable, but again only
after the city made significant findings and studied possible affordable
housing solutions, much like the City of Sacramento.9' Moreover, the
court specifically recognized that "The City's inclusionary zoning ordi-
nance imposes significant burdens on those who wish to develop their
property.""9 Therefore, the court noted specifically that "the ordinance
also provides significant benefits to those who comply with its terms
. . . expedited processing, fee deferrals, loans or grants and density
bonuses."93 Note also that the municipality provided over 700 pages
of documentation for its program, and set its required set-aside at only
10%. The continued viability of this decision is questionable following
the City of Patterson decision. 94
Moreover, these decisions must be read in the context of California's
Density Bonus Law which requires local governments to "reward devel-
opers that agree to build a certain percentage of low-income housing"
with increased density bonuses above those permitted by applicable
local regulations. 95 While the Density Bonus Law can, by itself, be con-
sidered a voluntary inclusionary zoning program, these density bonus
mandates are then tacked on to those already provided by a local gov-
ernment's inclusionary zoning program. 96 Therefore developers build-
89. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F2d 872, 875 (9th
Cir. 1991).
90. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001).
91. Id. at 62.
92. Id. at 64.
93. Id.
94. See Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Cent. Cal. v. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63 (Ct.
App. 2009).
95. Shea Homes L.P. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739 (Ct. App. 2003).
96. BARBARA A. KAUTz, A PUBLIC AGENCY GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA DENSITY BONUS
LAw (2005).
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ing in jurisdictions that impose inclusionary zoning ordinances have a
state guaranteed avenue to mitigate the burdens of providing affordable
housing required by local governments, and developers who build in
jurisdictions without inclusionary zoning programs nonetheless have
incentives to build affordable housing.
California Code section 6915 requires local governments to provide
applicants who "seek and agree to construct a housing development"
containing at least 5% of the units affordable to very low-income house-
holds or 10% of the units affordable to lower-income households with at
least a 20% density bonus.97 Developers may also set aside 10% moderate-
income affordable units but will only receive a 5% density bonus.98 In
order to create better incentives for developers to produce affordable
housing, the Density Bonus Law offers increased density bonuses on
a sliding scale for developers who meet and surpass the minimum set-
aside requirements." Depending upon the type of affordable unit set
aside, developers will receive a higher percent density bonus for every
percent increase in affordable housing they offer above the minimum
threshold. The developer will earn an increased density bonus of 2.5%
for every percent of very low-income housing set-aside, 1.5% for every
percent of lower-income housing set-aside, and 1% for every percent
of moderate-income housing set-aside.'" These density bonuses are
capped at 35%. Thus, a developer who sets aside 11% of the develop-
ment's units for very low-income units, 20% lower-income units, or
forty moderate-income units will earn the maximum density bonus.'0 '
Although the mandatory density bonus award under the state's Density
Bonus Law is capped at 35%, this maximum cannot be "construed to
prohibit a [local government] from granting a density bonus greater"
than that required by state law.102
California Code section 65915 also requires local governments to
provide developers who meet the above mentioned minimum set-aside
requirements with incentives or concessions that "result in identifiable,
financially sufficient, and actual cost reductions." 0 3 These concessions
and incentives include, but are not limited to, (1) reductions in develop-
ment standards, (2) modifications of zoning or building code require-
97. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65915(b)(1) (West 2008).
98. Id.
99. Id. §65915(f).
100. Id. § 65915(f)(1)-(4).
I01. Id.
102. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 659 15(n) (West 2008).
103. Id. § 65915(k).
324 THE URBAN LAWYER 42-4/43-1 FALL 2010/WINTER 2011
ments, and (3) "approval of mixed use zoning in conjunction with the
housing project" if it is compatible with the project and will reduce
costs.'" Local governments are required to provide developers with one
concession or incentive for every 10% of the total units dedicated to
lower-income households, 5% to very low-income households, or 10%
to moderate-income households.10 5 However, a developer may only
receive up to three concessions or incentives.' 06
Furthermore, in a recent interpretation of the Napa Valley case, a
California superior court held that where a city (there, San Diego) fails
to provide for a review of the constitutionality of a housing set-aside as
a ground for waiving it, "the ordinance on its face results in an uncon-
stitutional taking. .. "o107 The court reasoned:
[O]n its face, the ordinance does not provide for the granting of a waiver solely
because of an absence of any reasonable relationship or nexus between the impact of
the development or nexus between the impact of the development and the inclusion-
ary requirement. The city can, therefore, impose the inclusionary requirement on a
development not reasonably related to the need for that requirement. Inasmuch as
[this] does not allow the City to avoid the unconstitutional application of the ordi-
nance, the ordinance on its face results in an unconstitutional taking.'
F. Worth the Trouble? Surveys of Experience and
Practice
Given the constitutional problems with mandatory affordable housing
set-asides, are they worth creating and implementing? Based on rela-
tively recent reports and surveys, the answer is no-at least, not without
substantial incentives. While there are anecdotal reports of experience
with inclusionary zoning/mandatory housing set-asides in other juris-
dictions, a recent report from California is in all likelihood the most rel-
evant, recent and comprehensive. In that study 09 the authors surveyed
(by questionnaire) 107 local governments in California known to have
formal inclusionary zoning programs. Ninety-eight responded by 2003.
Among the report's key findings:
1. Density bonuses are by far the most popular incentive offered to
developers to build affordable housing, reported by 91% of the
104. Id. § 65915(1).
105. Id. § 65915(d)(2).
106. Id.
107. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of San Diego County, Inc. v. City of San Diego, No.
GIC817064, 2006 WL 1666822, at *2 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. May 24, 2006).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. NON-PROFIT Hous. Ass'N OF N. CAL., CAL. COAL. FOR RURAL Hous., INCLU-
sIoNARY HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA: 30 YEARS OF INNOVATION (2004).
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programs. "The mean percentage of affordable housing required
[for a density bonus] . . . is 13% . . . half of all programs require
at least 15%, of which nearly one-quarter of the programs require
20% or more. The most frequent inclusionary percentage is 10%
(44% ofjurisdictions).""0
2. The fast-track permit processing incentive is offered by 44% of
the jurisdictions surveyed.
3. Monetary subsidies are offered by 43% of the jurisdictions as an
incentive.
4. Other prevalent incentives include: fee waivers (38%), reductions
(32%) and deferrals (25%).
5. Programs "typically offer developers one or more alternatives to
constructing affordable units within the market-rate project. Most
common is paying fees in-lieu of construction, offered by 81% of
the reporting programs ... in two-thirds of the programs, develop-
ers are permitted to construct affordable units off-site."'
The report ends with the following cautionary observations: "[I]f builders
can't or won't build, then an inclusionary program is rendered virtually
meaningless. Accordingly, program design and revision must consider
both the benefits and potential limitations of each policy detail."I 2
As a response to the continued popularity and adoption of inclusion-
ary zoning ordinances in California, the Non-Profit Housing Association
did a follow-up study to the 2003 report. The most "astounding finding
of Affordable By Choice: Trends in California Inclusionary Housing
Programs 13 is the pace at which inclusionary housing programs are
being adopted in California." In less than 4 years, 63 jurisdictions ad-
opted inclusionary zoning ordinances bringing the total California ju-
risdictions employing inclusionary policies up to 170.114 This report,
which combines data collected for the 2003 report and a subsequent
survey in 2006, states 5 key findings:
1. Nearly one-third of California jurisdictions now have inclusion-
ary programs.
2. While more than 80,000 people have housing through these pro-
grams, this translates into about 20,000 units across the entire state.
110. See id. at iii (emphasis added).
1 11. Id. at iv.
112. Id. at 5.
113. NICK CALAVITAS, AFFORDABLE BY CHOICE: TRENDS IN CALIFORNIA INCLU-
SIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS (2007).
114. See id. at 3.
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3. Most of the affordable units produced are integrated within mar-
ket rate developments.
4. Affordable units serve those most in need. Approximately three
quarters of the affordable units produced are affordable to those
with the lowest incomes rather than those with moderate in-
comes.
5. Partnerships between market rate developers and affordable
housing developers have been utilized to serve the lower income
households."11
Some of this extensive experience in California is reflected in other
jurisdictions, particularly in terms of the average rate of set-aside and
the prevalence of density bonuses. Perhaps the most current source of
such further data is contained in a survey for the Urban Land Institute
(ULI). 1 6 The introductory materials note that inclusionary zoning is not
a particularly productive or efficient way of approaching our national
crisis in affordable housing. Thus for example, the highly rated program
in Montgomery County, Maryland produces only about 8% of the total
yearly addition to the county's stock of affordable housing. In the oft-
touted Boston program, of the 20,340 subsidized low-income housing
units produced between 1990 and 1997, a mere 1,200 came from inclu-
sionary zoning programs.
Of course this number must be viewed against Massachusetts's
statewide statutory provision that grants developers density bonuses
without having to invoke inclusionary zoning ordinances." 7 Massa-
chusetts's Chapter 40B" 8 allows developers who provide a minimum
amount of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income households
to receive building permits under an expedited process, which allow
the developer to build housing without regard for the zoning require-
ments or any other locally adopted regulations."l9 This statute is invoked
by both non-profit developers building entirely affordable projects as
well as for profit developers who desire to build at higher densities than
115. See id. at 5.
116. DOUGLAS PORTER, INCLUSIONARY ZONING FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING
(2004).
117. See JENNY SCHUETZ, RACHEL MELTZER & VICKI BEEN, THE EFFECTS OF IN-
CLUSIONARY ZONING ON HOUSING MARKETS: LESSONS FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO,
WASHINGTON DC AND SUBURBAN BOSTON AREAS (2007) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF IN-
CLUSIONARY ZONING].
118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B (2009).
119. BRIAN BLAESSER, ET AL., INCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS LEARNED IN MAS-
SACHUSETTS (2002), available at http://www.mhp.net/uploads/resourcesfinclusionary
zoning..Iessons Iearned.pdf.
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would otherwise be allowed under the local zoning ordinance.120 It is
true that, like Boston, California offers the density bonus provisions
through state legislation for developers who voluntarily set aside afford-
able housing, however, unlike Massachusetts's Chapter 40B, Califor-
nia's legislation supplements the provisions of municipal inclusionary
ordinances.121 While California developers are still required to set aside
housing for affordable housing in accordance with local inclusionary
zoning ordinances, approximately 80% of all affordable housing pro-
duction in Boston is created under Chapter 40B instead of local inclu-
sionary ordinances.122
The 2004 ULI report further notes that all the programs surveyed
provide some sort of bonus to developers who set aside part of their
projects for affordable/workforce housing. Some other examples of
programs that provide bonuses: Fairfax, Virginia, 10 to 20% density bo-
nuses plus relaxed setback and yard requirements; Longmont, Colorado,
up to 20% density bonuses; Burlington, Vermont, 15 to 25% density
bonuses; Cambridge, Massachusetts, 15% density bonuses; Somerville,
Massachusetts, 20% density bonuses; Ft. Collins, Colorado, negotiable
density bonuses plus expedited/waived development processes; Denver,
Colorado, cash payments ranging from $5,000 to $10,000 per afford-
able unit, plus negotiated density bonuses.123 Other communities are
reportedly even more generous with respect to bonuses and incentives
for affordable housing: Highland Park, Illinois, one additional market-
rate unit for each affordable unit constructed, plus waiver of building
permit, sewer/water tap-on, and impact fees for affordable units.
In sum, experience in those jurisdictions that have set-aside programs
indicates they have so far been only moderately successful in produc-
ing affordable housing when compared to total volume of housing and
total state population, and virtually all programs provide for generous
bonuses to developers providing such housing.
II. Conclusion
There are virtually no instances of courts countenancing naked link-
age or affordable housing set-aside requirements on residential devel-
opments without substantial bonuses, usually consisting of significant
density increases. Indeed, a recent report from a nonprofit coalition on
120. EFFEcTs OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING, supra note 117.
121. Id. at 30.
122. Id.
123. PORTER, supra note 116.
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housing in California concludes that most California local governments
with inclusionary affordable housing programs provide a range of sub-
stantial density bonuses and other advantages to developers required to
provide affordable housing, and the average percentage of such housing
requirements is closer to 10%, with 20% being at the high end of the
spectrum. This experience is replicated in other surveys of other juris-
dictions.
As to workforce housing exactions or set-asides on commercial de-
velopment, the principal-indeed virtually only-federal case approv-
ing such set-asides did so only after the local government requiring such
set-asides engaged in thorough and detailed studies of the workforce
jobs required and generated by the proposed commercial development,
which requirements were then cut in half. If government wishes to
enact an ordinance mandating affordable housing set-asides or fees on
commercial development (not zoning, but actual development) despite
evidence of marginal success in actively providing affordable housing,
then it should consider the basis upon which the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld such an ordinance passed by the City of Sacramento
and:
1. Undertake a detailed study of the precise need for workforce
housing;
2. On a project by project basis;
3. Calculate the precise fee or set-aside each project requires;
4. Cut that fee in half before applying it to a given project;
5. Provide meaningful density bonuses, expedited permitting and
grants. 124
Thus, provided the percentage is (1) applied to developments that
drive a need for affordable housing, and (2) set low enough to survive
a proportionality challenge, this may then produce a percentage-
although likely not a large one-of the affordable, low income, work-
force housing needs of the community.125
124. See Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991).
125. For a thorough analysis of set asides in the context of proportionate share theory
and practice, see ARTHUR C. NELSON, ET AL., A GUIDE TO IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY (2008).
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